Manchester United haven’t won a league game since the end of August, and Lisandro Martinez has pointed the finger at a lack of investment in the squad. But a detailed tactical breakdown by The Athletic FC this week argues the real problem is on the training pitch, not in the transfer market: Michael Carrick’s side press in a shape that hands the opposition a free man, sit in a mid-block with the same hole in it, and switch off at the moments that decide games.
The numbers look fine, until you look closer
Across their first six league games, United’s expected goals against is roughly level with Manchester City’s, which sounds like a defence doing its job. Look at who those six games were against, though, and the picture changes. The run has included Hull, Ipswich, Everton and Fulham, and two of the harder fixtures came with an asterisk: United played around 70 minutes against ten men in the City game and around 18 minutes a man up against Tottenham.
The quality of chance United allow tells the truer story. Their expected goals per shot faced is the third worst in the division, down with Sunderland and Brighton, and 70 per cent of the shots they face are taken inside their own penalty area, another bottom-three figure. Teams don’t need many attacks to hurt United. One good one will do, because once the first line is beaten there is very little between the ball and Senne Lammens’ goal.
A front two asked to do a three-man job
United defend in a 4-4-2 that regularly looks like a 4-2-4, with the wingers starting high and the midfield pair left to patrol an enormous space. The core problem sits at the front of the shape. Against a side building up with two centre-backs and a holding midfielder, United’s two forwards are asked to press the centre-backs and lock onto the pivot at the same time. That is three jobs for two players, and it forces a choice: engage the ball and leave the pivot free, or screen the pivot and let the centre-backs carry the ball out unchallenged.
Diego Simeone’s old rule for a defensive team is that it must stay compact in both directions, close together side to side and front to back. United are neither when they press. The front two stretch across the width of the opposition back line, the midfield stays home, and the gap between the lines becomes the most valuable real estate on the pitch, exactly where the opposition’s most secure passer is standing.
The pendulum press, and why it keeps snapping
The Athletic’s analysts give United’s press a name: the pendulum. Instead of the front two pressing together in a curve that blocks the middle, one forward swings across to close down the ball while his partner swings the other way to cover the far centre-back, and the pair rock side to side as the ball moves. It looks organised. It isn’t, because every swing opens the door behind it. The moment a forward commits to the swing, the pivot behind him is free, the opposition full-back on the far side is free, and the winger on that side has been dragged so high that he can’t recover.
The Tottenham game supplied the perfect illustration. From a Spurs throw-in, two passes were enough to take out the entire first line and leave Spurs running at United’s back four in a four-versus-four break. A press that a throw-in and two passes can dismantle is a suggestion, and good teams treat it as one, playing through it at walking pace before attacking the space the swing has vacated.
The pendulum press: United’s front two swing side to side, the opposition pivot stands free behind them, and the midfield pair inherit the whole pitch.
The same hole, twenty yards deeper
Dropping into a mid-block doesn’t solve it, because United carry the same distances into the deeper shape. The lines are still too far apart, the front two still can’t screen the pivot and engage the ball, and opponents have learned to move the block rather than play through it: work the ball to one side, draw United across, then switch it quickly and attack the far side before the shape has shuffled over. Mohammed Kudus had a clear chance at the penalty spot against Spurs from exactly that pattern, arriving unmarked in the space the shifting block had left behind.
That should worry Carrick most. A pressing side can be beaten by quality. A mid-block is beaten by patience and one switch of play, which means United currently have no defensive mode that survives contact with a well-coached opponent. It also explains the individual errors piling up, the subject of our predicted lineup for the Leeds game: defenders asked to defend too much space will eventually defend it badly.
The individuals making it worse
Structure explains the pattern, but the video is just as hard on the players inside it. Luke Shaw is caught arguing with a linesman while play develops around him. Bryan Mbeumo takes up a pressing position so high he’s effectively marking nobody, a spare man in the wrong team. Carlos Baleba vacates the centre of the pitch to chase a ball he can’t win, and Savinho bursts straight through the space he has left. Joshua Zirkzee loses the man he has tracked back to mark. Diogo Dalot defends zonally when the moment demands he engage his man. And for one Spurs goal, Dominic Solanke beats Martinez at the back post while Matheus Cunha, the nearest United player, does little to affect the cross.
None of these is a talent problem. Each is a concentration or coaching problem, a player either not given a clear enough job or not held to it, and that decides whether the fix is a transfer window or a training week.
Cunha, the symbol of a switched-off press
The analysis reserves its longest section for Cunha, and it isn’t really about running. It’s about awareness. In one clip, a quick opposition goal-kick and a single pass play through six United players because Cunha hasn’t scanned what is behind him. In another, against Spurs, he turns his back on the play entirely as Lucas Bergvall receives the ball in the area Cunha was supposed to be screening. A forward in a two-man press is the trigger for everything behind him: if he switches off, the swing starts late, the distances stretch, and the whole structure goes with him.
Cunha is too good a player for this to be about ability. It looks like a player who hasn’t been made to feel that the defensive detail is his job, in a team where, as the Martinez selection debate showed in our look at what a new manager’s United might look like, too much is currently being explained away by circumstances.
The fix is on the coaching staff
The encouraging part of the breakdown is that the solutions are neither exotic nor expensive. Modern pressing sides solve the two-versus-three problem by pushing a midfielder up to join the front line, turning the 4-4-2 into a diamond press: two forwards on the centre-backs, the advanced midfielder locked onto the pivot, and the second midfielder holding behind them. The free man disappears, the swing is no longer needed, and the same players can still drop back into a compact 4-4-2 when the ball goes dead.
The modern fix: a midfielder steps up to form a diamond, the pivot is marked, and the front two press the centre-backs with cover behind them.
Which brings the argument back to Martinez’s comments. Framing this as an investment problem is a deflection, because the evidence points at structure and individual coaching: distances, roles, scanning, engagement. Those are set on the training ground. The breakdown’s conclusion is that a squad with this much talent, given a pressing structure without a built-in free man and forwards coached to treat the defensive detail as their own job, would be challenging for Champions League places rather than explaining a winless run stretching back to August.






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